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The United States is the world’s largest wildlife import-
er, and imported wild animals represent a potential source 
of zoonotic pathogens. Using data on mammals imported 
during 2000–2005, we assessed their potential to host 27 
selected risk zoonoses and created a risk assessment 
that could inform policy making for wildlife importation and 
zoonotic disease surveillance. A total of 246,772 mam-
mals in 190 genera (68 families) were imported. The most 
widespread agents of risk zoonoses were rabies virus (in 
78 genera of mammals), Bacillus anthracis (57), Mycobac-
terium tuberculosis complex (48), Echinococcus spp. (41), 
and Leptospira spp. (35). Genera capable of harboring the 
greatest number of risk zoonoses were Canis and Felis (14 
each), Rattus (13), Equus (11), and Macaca and Lepus (10 
each). These ﬁ  ndings demonstrate the myriad opportunities 
for zoonotic pathogens to be imported and suggest that, 
to ensure public safety, immediate proactive changes are 
needed at multiple levels. 
M
ost emerging infectious diseases are caused by 
zoonotic pathogens (1,2). The number and propor-
tion of these diseases that originate in wild animals in par-
ticular has increased substantially in the past few decades, 
even after accounting for increased reports of new emerg-
ing infectious diseases (1). This trend and recent pandem-
ics of wildlife-origin infectious diseases (e.g., HIV, severe 
acute respiratory syndrome) suggest that targeted surveil-
lance efforts should focus on activities that bring humans 
and wildlife in close contact (1,3).
The United States is among the world’s largest import-
ers of live wild animals (4) and imported >1 billion indi-
vidual animals during 2000–2004 (5). Little disease sur-
veillance is conducted for imported animals; quarantine is 
required for only wild birds, primates, and some ungulates 
arriving in the United States, and mandatory testing exists 
for only a few diseases (psittacosis, foot and mouth dis-
ease, Newcastle disease, avian inﬂ  uenza). Other animals 
are typically only screened for physical signs of disease, 
and pathogen testing is delegated to either the US Depart-
ment of Agriculture (for livestock) or the importer (6). 
The process of preimport housing and importation often 
involves keeping animals at high density and in unnatural 
groupings of species, providing opportunities for cross-
species transmission and ampliﬁ  cation of known and un-
known pathogens. Thus, imported wildlife remain a major 
public health threat, as exempliﬁ  ed by the importation of 
Ebola virus in primates from the Philippines (7), monkey-
pox from imported African rodents (8), and possibly HIV 
from chimpanzees in central Africa (9). Wildlife importa-
tion also poses a great threat to domestic wildlife and the 
US agriculture industry (5).
To analyze the volume and diversity of live mammals 
that have been imported into the United States in recent 
years, we used data from the US Fish and Wildlife Service 
Law Enforcement Management Information System. We 
focused on mammals because of the frequency and sever-
ity of previously reported mammal-borne zoonoses and 
because of the frequent close association between humans 
and many mammalian species (e.g., as pets). We then as-
sessed the zoonotic diseases that imported mammals are 
known to host. Our results may be used to inform policy 
decisions about wildlife importation and zoonotic disease 
surveillance and may alert clinicians to the broad range of 
possible zoonoses that may be encountered in patients who 
have been exposed to imported animals.
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Methods
We used Freedom of Information Act requests to ob-
tain records from the database of the US Fish and Wildlife 
Service Law Enforcement Management Information Sys-
tem. We obtained records for all wildlife shipments into 
the United States during 2000–2005 through 14 of the 18 
designated animal importation ports (Anchorage, Alaska; 
Atlanta, Georgia; Baltimore, Maryland; Boston, Massachu-
setts; Chicago, Illinois; Dallas, Texas; Honolulu, Hawaii; 
Los Angeles, California; Miami, Florida; New Orleans, 
Louisiana; New York, New York; Portland, Oregon; San 
Francisco, California; and Seattle, Washington). Data were 
not available for Houston, Texas; Louisville, Kentucky; 
Memphis, Tennessee; and Newark, New Jersey. For each 
importation, we acquired information on the taxonomy, 
quantity, source (e.g., wild-caught, farmed), country of 
origin, intermediate port of call, port of entry, and declared 
purpose of all live specimens. Descriptive analyses were 
performed to determine the volume of trade from various 
regions of the world and the types of mammals imported. 
Individual importation events were then grouped into gen-
era to determine the diversity of taxa imported. The phylo-
genetic relationships and geographic ranges of host mam-
mals were determined by using the Animal Diversity Web 
at the University of Michigan Museum of Zoology (http://
animaldiversity.ummz.umich.edu/site/index.html).
We searched the literature to identify the zoonotic 
pathogens known to occur in animals of each taxon in the 
database. Only data on live animal importations (as opposed 
to animal products) and importations for which the genus 
was known were retained for analysis. Statistical analyses 
were performed by using Intercooled Stata 9 (StataCorp, 
College Station, TX, USA). In our ﬁ  nal risk assessment, we 
did not account for the origin of each speciﬁ  c importation 
because of limitations in the database, likely caused by a 
complicated system of exportation and reimportation.
We created a list of relevant zoonotic diseases at risk 
for importation (hereafter referred to as risk zoonoses) by 
searching the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
website (www.cdc.gov) and the World Health Organiza-
tion website (www.who.int), reviewing the list of Select 
Agents (agents with bioterrorism potential) of the US De-
partment of Health and Human Services (10), and con-
sulting experts in the ﬁ  eld. To be on the list, diseases had 
to meet the following 5 criteria: 1) the pathogen must be 
zoonotic (there must be a recorded instance of infection of 
a human from an animal source); 2) the pathogen must be 
capable of causing signiﬁ  cant illness or death (e.g., fungal 
skin infections would not be on the list because although 
they are extremely common zoonoses, their effects are 
rarely debilitating); 3) the pathogen must be present in 
animals in the wild (i.e., not only in experimental mod-
els); 4) the pathogen must not currently be widespread in 
the United States, or it must have the potential for new 
epidemiology with regard to transmission (e.g., Yersinia 
pestis is presently found in wild rodents in the western 
United States, but it is not expected to be found in animals 
sold as pets); and 5) if the pathogen uses an intermediate 
vector, competent vectors must exist in the United States. 
The resulting list comprised 30 risk zoonoses (20 viral 
diseases, 9 bacterial diseases, and 1 helminthic disease); 
no fungal, protozoal, or prion diseases were on the list, 
and thus they were not analyzed.
Determination of the host range of the risk zoonoses 
was accomplished through systematic genus-driven and 
pathogen-driven searches of PubMed databases (www.
pubmed.gov), the Google search engine (www.google.
com), and references within published works. Conﬁ  rmed 
presence was deﬁ  ned as either isolation of the pathogen 
from an animal or serologic evidence of past infection. 
For all animals identiﬁ  ed in the literature as carrying a risk 
zoonosis, genus and family were recorded. The host rang-
es of all of the risk zoonoses were then cross-referenced 
against the imported genera to generate tables showing dis-
eases found in each imported genus (affected genera). If 
the disease was found in a different genus within the same 
family, this was also noted (potentially affected genera). 
The justiﬁ  cation for this expanded risk assessment is the 
host nonspeciﬁ  city of many infectious diseases; lack of evi-
dence for the presence of a given disease in a given host 
should not be construed as evidence against its presence.
Results
During 2000–2005, a total of 4,067 shipment fractions 
of mammals were imported (a shipment fraction is the sum 
of all animals of a single species in a given shipment; a 
single shipment may contain several shipment fractions), 
totaling 246,772 individual mammals and representing 190 
genera and 68 families. The average number of animals 
per shipment fraction was 61 (range 1–8,000). The most 
common declared purpose for importation was commercial 
use (not classiﬁ  ed according to pet trade, food, traditional 
medicine, etc.), accounting for 66% (163,760 individuals) 
of the total. The second most common declared purpose 
was biomedical research, accounting for 28% (69,986 in-
dividuals) of the total. Only a small number of individu-
als were imported for breeding, educational, zoo, personal, 
and other uses. Numbers of the most commonly imported 
animals were 126,014 (>50% of all imported individuals) 
long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis), 30,058 small 
desert hamsters (Phodopus sungorus), 19,724 rhesus ma-
caques (Macaca mulatta), 19,537 raccoons (Procyon lo-
tor), and 7,112 chinchillas (Chinchilla lanigera). Together, 
these 5 species accounted for 82% of all imported individu-
als. By number of shipment fractions, the most common 
animals were 1,343 M. fascicularis macaques, 332 Cal-
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lithrix jacchus marmosets, 229 M. mulatta macaques, 165 
C. lanigera chinchillas, and 107 Potos ﬂ  avus kinkajous.
The most common countries of origin for animal ship-
ment fractions were People’s Republic of China (717 ship-
ment fractions); Guyana (635), United Kingdom (359), 
Vietnam (314), and Indonesia (305). These values must be 
interpreted cautiously, however, because many animals are 
imported and then reexported; thus, their true origin may 
become obscured. For example, a “wild-caught” chinchilla 
with a “country of origin” of Czech Republic must have 
originated elsewhere because chinchillas are native to 
Chile. A comparison between the natural geographic range 
of all wild-caught animals and their stated countries of ori-
gin showed that >25% of the pairings were impossible (i.e., 
the animals could not have come from their stated country 
of origin). This limitation is inherent in the way US Fish 
and Wildlife Service Law Enforcement Management Infor-
mation System data are collected, and we were unable to 
correct these data.
The source of the animals was largely uninterpreta-
ble because 49% of all individuals were declared as being 
sourced from “animal derivatives and parts,” despite the fact 
that we had selected only live animals for our analysis, and 
despite the fact that “animal derivatives and parts” is not one 
of the permitted responses to this question. Another 29% 
were declared as “captive-bred” and 15% as “wild-caught.”
For the ﬁ  nal list of risk zoonoses, 3 of the original 
30 agents (Hendra virus, Menangle virus, and Rickettsia 
prowazekii) were removed because few, if any, genera 
were found to harbor these infections; the ﬁ  nal tables there-
fore include 27 diseases (Tables 1–3). The risk zoonoses 
capable of infecting the greatest number of genera were: ra-
bies viruses, in 78 genera; Bacillus anthracis, the causative 
agent of anthrax, in 57 genera; Mycobacterium tuberculo-
sis complex, in 48 genera; Echinococcus spp., the agents 
of hydatid cyst disease, in 41 genera; Leptospira spp., in 
35 genera; Brucella spp., the agents of undulant fever, in 
32 genera; Francisella tularensis, the agent of tularemia, 
in 31 genera; Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus, in 
27 genera; Y. pestis, the agent of plague, in 24 genera; and 
Coxiella burnetii, the agent of Q fever, in 20 genera (Table 
2; online Technical Appendix, available from www.cdc.
gov/EID/content/15/11/1721-Techapp.pdf).
If each genus within affected families is counted as 
potentially capable of harboring a risk zoonosis (accord-
ing to the principle that many diseases are not entirely 
host speciﬁ  c), the number of genera potentially capable of 
harboring rabies viruses rises to 155 (82% of all imported 
taxa); potential carriers of Leptospira spp. increase to 131; 
M. tuberculosis complex to 124; F. tularensis to 115; B. 
anthracis to 113; C. burnetii to 108; and Y. pestis to 101.
The genera capable of harboring the greatest number 
of risk zoonoses were Canis (dogs) and Felis (cats), 14 
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Table 1. Risk zoonoses and their associated clinical syndromes 
in humans* 
Pathogen
Primary clinical 
syndrome in humans 
Viruses 
  Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus Aseptic meningitis
  Cercopithecine herpesvirus-1  
 (herpes  B)
Encephalitis
 Nipah  virus Encephalitis
 Rabies  viruses† Encephalitis
 Venezuelan  equine 
 encephalitis  virus
Encephalitis
  Tick-borne encephalitis virus
 complex†
Encephalitis or 
hemorrhagic fever
 Crimean-Congo  hemorrhagic  fever 
 virus
Hemorrhagic fever
 Ebola  viruses† Hemorrhagic  fever
  Lassa fever virus Hemorrhagic fever
 Marburg  virus Hemorrhagic  fever
  Rift Valley fever virus Hemorrhagic fever
  South American hemorrhagic fever 
 arenaviruses†
Hemorrhagic fever
  Hantaviruses associated with HFRS† Hemorrhagic fever 
with nephropathy
  Hantaviruses associated with HCPS† Severe respiratory 
syndrome
  Highly pathogenic avian influenza 
 (H5N1)  virus
Severe respiratory 
syndrome
  SARS virus (or SARS-like CoV) Severe respiratory 
syndrome
  Yellow fever virus Systemic illness or 
hemorrhagic fever
 Monkeypox  virus Systemic  illness  or 
rash 
Bacteria
 Brucella spp. Systemic illness
 Coxiella  burnetii Systemic illness
 Leptospira spp. Systemic illness
 Bacillus  anthracis Varies by site of 
infection
 Burkholderia  mallei Varies by site of 
infection
 Francisella  tularensis Varies by site of 
infection
 Mycobacterium  tuberculosis complex† Varies by site of 
infection
 Yersinia  pestis Varies by site of 
infection
Helminths, Echinococcus spp. Hydatid cyst disease
*Risk zoonoses, relevant zoonotic diseases at risk for importation into the 
United States; HFRS, hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome; HCPS, 
hantavirus cardiopulmonary syndrome; SARS, severe acute respiratory 
syndrome; CoV, coronavirus. 
†Rabies viruses includes the zoonotic lyssaviruses Australian bat 
lyssavirus, Duvenhage, European bat lyssavirus 1 and 2, Mokolo, and 
rabies (11);  tick-borne encephalitis complex includes Kyasanur Forest 
disease, Omsk hemorrhagic fever, and tickborne encephalitis (11);
Ebolaviruses include Bundibugyo, Côte d'Ivoire, Reston, Sudan, and Zaire 
(11); epidemiologically relevant South American hemorrhagic fever 
arenaviruses include Guanarito, Junin, Machupo, and Sabia (11); 
hantaviruses associated with HFRS include Dobrava, Hantaan, Puumala, 
Saaremaa, and Seoul (11); hantaviruses associated with HCPS include 
Andes, Bayou, Black Creek Canal, Laguna Negra, New York, and Sin 
Nombre (11); Mycobacterium tuberculosis complex species are M. 
africanum, M. bovis, M. bovis BCG, M. caprae, M. microti, M. pinnipedii,
and M. tuberculosis hominis (12).PERSPECTIVE
risk zoonoses each; Rattus (rats), 13; Equus (horses), 11; 
Macaca (macaques), 10; Lepus (rabbits and hares), 10; and 
Ovis (sheep) and Vulpes (foxes), 9 each (Table 3). Of the 
individuals in these high-risk genera, 49% were intended 
for commercial purposes and 44% were intended for bio-
medical research.
The families found to harbor the most risk zoonoses 
(excluding Hominidae because, by deﬁ   nition, they are 
capable of harboring all zoonotic diseases) were Muridae 
(Old World mice and rats, gerbils, whistling rats, and rela-
tives), 21 risk zoonoses; Cricetidae (New World rats and 
mice, voles, hamsters, and relatives), 20; Canidae (coyotes, 
dogs, foxes, jackals, and wolves), 16; and Bovidae (ante-
lopes, cattle, gazelles, goats, sheep, and relatives) and Feli-
dae (cats), 15 each.
Discussion
Our data demonstrate that myriad opportunities exist 
for key zoonotic pathogens to be imported into the United 
States or, if already present, to be introduced in a new con-
text (e.g., in an animal sold as a pet). Imported animals of a 
large number of taxa were found to be capable of carrying 
risk zoonoses; these diseases include such serious public 
health threats as rabies, the ﬁ  lovirus hemorrhagic fevers, 
tuberculosis, and highly pathogenic avian inﬂ  uenza.
This study likely underestimates the broad nature of 
risk associated with the importation of wild animals. We 
examined only families in the class Mammalia that have 
been shown to harbor risk zoonoses; however, many patho-
gens routinely cross boundaries at least as high as the class 
level (e.g., human psittacosis from birds), if not higher. 
Furthermore, we included only live animals in this analy-
sis; recent outbreaks associated with animal products (e.g., 
cutaneous anthrax from an imported goat hide used for 
making drums) attest to the risks associated even with dead 
animals (13). Finally, the study can neither estimate the risk 
for unknown pathogens, which may be imported but not 
yet identiﬁ  ed, nor assess the volume and zoonotic risk cre-
ated by illegal wildlife trade. Animals may be smuggled 
speciﬁ  cally because they have been banned from trade as a 
result of perceived or recognized health threats. Some ani-
mals on our list of risk zoonoses have already been banned 
from importation (e.g., masked palm civets, birds from 
countries affected by highly pathogenic avian inﬂ  uenza 
[H5N1]) (14). However, pathogens have been identiﬁ  ed 
in illegally imported wildlife; e.g., a pair of crested hawk-
eagles (Spizaetus nipalensis) smuggled from Thailand and 
recently conﬁ  scated in Belgium were infected with highly 
pathogenic avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) (15).
We did not quantitatively assess the risk for transmis-
sion of each pathogen at each importation event. Rather, 
we attempted to demonstrate the breadth of risk associated 
with importations of wild animals in general. Quantitative 
prevalence of the various pathogens in each wildlife host is 
highly variable, and determining it is beyond the scope of 
our analysis. Some genera represent the primary reservoirs 
of certain pathogens (e.g., Peromyscus for certain hantavi-
ruses), whereas proof of the permissiveness of other genera 
to certain pathogens is limited to isolated case reports (e.g., 
Ebola Zaire virus in the duiker Cephalophus). Perhaps the 
greatest unknown associated with quantifying risks for 
each of the zoonoses is a pathogen’s infectivity in various 
hosts. Some pathogens may increase to a high enough load 
in their hosts to be infectious; others may cause nothing 
more than a measurable serologic response in what is oth-
erwise a dead-end host (though explicitly known dead-end 
hosts have been excluded from these analyses).
Our analysis highlights several ways that the US Fish 
and Wildlife Service could improve data collection. To 
enhance public health ofﬁ  cials’ ability to trace back the 
sources of imported zoonotic diseases, record keeping of 
the point of origin of shipments could be expanded to in-
clude not just their most recent and previous point of ori-
gin (as is currently done with the “Country of Origin” and 
“Country of Importation/Exportation/Re-importation”) but 
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Table 2. Risk zoonoses capable of infecting the greatest number 
of imported mammal genera 
Pathogen
No. (%) affected 
genera*
No. (%)  potentially 
affected genera† 
Rabies viruses‡  78 (41)  155 (82) 
Bacillus anthracis 57 (30)  113 (59) 
Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis complex‡ 
48 (25)  124 (65) 
Echinococcus spp.  41 (22)  89 (47) 
Leptospira spp.  35 (18)  131 (69) 
Brucella spp.  32 (17)  95 (50) 
Francisella tularensis 31 (16)  115 (61) 
Crimean-Congo 
hemorrhagic fever virus 
27 (14)  91 (48) 
Yersinia pestis 24 (13)  101 (53) 
Coxiella burnetii 20 (11)  108 (57) 
*Risk zoonosis (relevant zoonotic disease at risk for importation into the 
United States) identified in genus; n = 190. 
†Risk zoonosis identified in different genus within same family; n = 190. 
‡Risk zoonoses, relevant zoonotic diseases at risk for importation into the 
United States.  Refer to Table 1 footnote for explanation of pathogen 
complexes. 
Table 3. Mammal genera capable of harboring the greatest 
number of risk zoonoses* 
Genus (common name)  No. (%) risk zoonoses 
Canis (dogs) 14 (52) 
Felis (cats) 14 (52) 
Rattus (rats) 13 (48) 
Equus (horses) 11 (41) 
Macaca (macaques) 10 (37) 
Lepus (rabbits and hares) 10 (37) 
Ovis (sheep) 9 (33) 
Vulpes (foxes) 9 (33) 
*Risk zoonoses, relevant zoonotic diseases at risk for importation into the 
United States; n = 27.  Importing Zoonotic Diseases through Wildlife Trade
also their actual origin. Accurate recording of the source of 
the animals (e.g., wild-caught, captive-bred) is also needed. 
Our results showed that half of all individuals had a de-
clared source that was not one of the allowed choices (e.g., 
wild-caught, captive-bred). The source of an animal af-
fects not only the likely level of risk (i.e., one would expect 
captive-bred individuals to carry fewer zoonotic diseases 
than wild-caught individuals) but also mitigation strategies 
when zoonotic diseases are identiﬁ  ed (e.g., euthanizing a 
colony vs. improving quarantine after capture).
The potential for importation of zoonoses that would 
pose a major public health threat suggests that increased 
surveillance should be applied to imported wildlife in the 
United States. One opportunity to reduce this threat is re-
striction of importation of key high-risk species, as was 
done when the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
used emergency powers to restrict importation of Gambian 
pouched rats during the monkeypox outbreak (14). Given 
the great diversity of animals identiﬁ  ed by our analysis as 
potentially hazardous, broad importation bans would likely 
be necessary if the goal were to substantially decrease the 
overall risk. Political or social support may be limited for 
such broad bans, both in the United States (as one of the 
world’s largest purchasers of wildlife) and abroad (where 
wildlife trade can have profound economic beneﬁ  ts).
 Furthermore, illegalizing trade may only increase un-
derground (illicit) trade, thereby eliminating the possibility 
of screening shipments for potential hazards. A more effec-
tive and acceptable strategy would be enhancing surveil-
lance for the speciﬁ  c pathogens noted for the key risk gen-
era (those harboring the greatest number of risk zoonoses, 
i.e., Canis, Felis, Rattus, Equus, Macaca, Lepus, Ovis, and 
Vulpes). Notably, the numbers of shipments of mammals is 
low relative to other wildlife groups (e.g., ﬁ  sh and reptiles). 
Lawmakers’ interests in protecting our borders from exter-
nal bioterrorism threats intersect with the need to protect 
ourselves from zoonotic diseases; many Category A bio-
terrorism threats (e.g., anthrax, plague, tularemia, and the 
viral hemorrhagic fevers) (10) are represented in the risk 
zoonoses outlined above. Finally, to facilitate the standard-
ization of surveillance and detection of infection events, the 
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists should in-
clude all of the risk zoonoses among their states’ notiﬁ  able 
diseases (most of which are already included).
Perhaps one of the simplest practical interventions for 
minimizing zoonotic disease risk is reduction of opportuni-
ties for transmission from wildlife to humans. Although a 
large proportion of imported animals are destined for bio-
medical research (in which potential occupational risks are 
largely understood and quarantine procedures likely miti-
gate risk), a greater proportion (even among the high-risk 
genera) are destined for commercial use and therefore could 
expose a wider group of persons to zoonotic diseases. Edu-
cation of professionals likely to come in close contact with 
imported animals (e.g., veterinarians, importers, pet store 
employees), as well as the general public, should empha-
size the risks for contracting zoonotic diseases from wild-
life and pets (16) and the need for proper hygiene, safety 
procedures, and personal protective equipment (17).
The recommendations above mirror others that exist 
in policy documents by the Defenders of Wildlife (5), in 
the 2003 joint position statement by the National Associa-
tion of Public Health Veterinarians and the Council of State 
and Territorial Epidemiologists (18), and in a recent Policy 
Forum article (19). These reports describe clear steps for 
mitigating the risks presented by imported wildlife, yet 
their recommendations have so far gone largely unheeded. 
To ensure public safety, immediate proactive changes are 
needed at multiple levels. Such measures would be most 
effective if organized in consultation with groups involved 
in the wildlife trade.
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